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Abstract—We propose and experimentally demonstrate a 
scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key 
Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking 
attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened 
by the single-photon detectors. The countermeasure is based on 
the creation of modes that are not deterministically accessible to 
the eavesdropper. We experimentally show that the use of 
beamsplitters and extra single-photon detectors at the receiver 
station passively creates randomized spatial modes that erase any 
knowledge the eavesdropper might have gained when using 
bright-light faked states. Additionally, we experimentally show a 
detector-scrambling approach where the random selection of the 
detector used for each measurement – equivalent to an active 
spatial mode randomization – hashes out the side-channel open 
by the detection efficiency mismatch-based attacks. The proposed 
combined countermeasure represents a practical and readily 
implementable solution against the main classes of quantum 
hacking attacks aimed on the single-photon detector so far, 
without intervening on the inner working of the devices. 
Index Terms—Avalanche photodiodes (APDs); Quantum 
communications; Quantum cryptography; Quantum detectors; 
Quantum hacking and countermeasures. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UANTUM key distribution (QKD) [1] benefits from the 
laws of quantum physics to provide absolutely secure 
communication [2] between two communicating parties (Alice 
and Bob), even if imperfect devices are used [3-5]. 
Imperfections on the equipment used in a QKD system can be 
related to sources that emit multi-photon pulses which enable 
the photon-number splitting attack [1]. Clever solutions based 
on fundamental principles were used to overcome such 
imperfections, as in the decoy states method [6-9], which 
enable a more efficient use of imperfect photon sources – 
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more specifically weak coherent states with moderate multi-
photon probability – for QKD.  
Recently a critical point was recognized: back-doors may be 
open in some physical devices comprising the QKD system, 
specially the single-photon detector (SPD). The flaws may be 
explored by an eavesdropper (Eve) for side-channel attacks 
[10-23], which can jeopardize the security of the protocol. 
These quantum hacking attacks are interventions caused by 
Eve from the outside of Bob’s station by high-jacking the 
detection apparatus – whose response can be predicted in 
some degree or even manipulated. In all cases, the attacks 
make it possible for an eavesdropper to gain information 
without being noticed, i.e., achieving a critically high mutual 
information with Alice and Bob without exceeding the upper 
threshold of the quantum bit error rate (QBER). 
The hacking schemes basically aim on two key points: 
exploring the imperfect nature of the SPD – efficiency 
mismatched-based attacks [10-12] – or externally forcing a 
deterministic result on the detection equipment – bright-light-
based attacks [14-19]. Different countermeasures to avoid 
detector-aimed quantum hacking attacks have been presented 
[10-28]. Despite being effective for the proposed specific end, 
i.e., closing a specific back-door, the solutions have no 
guarantees of being final, in the sense that the vulnerabilities 
depend on the physical implementation of the devices and the 
deployment of the systems. The counter-measures give, in the 
best case, ad hoc protection over some class of attacks. 
Measurement-device-independent QKD has been recently 
proposed to eliminate detection [29] and/or state preparation 
[30] loopholes. Although making use of sophisticated schemes 
based on long-distance interference at a third remote station 
[31] and (reversely or not) entangled systems, practical 
implementations of the schemes have been reported [32-35]. 
Nevertheless, the well-established traditional BB84-like QKD 
systems still lack a definitive solution against quantum 
hacking. 
We propose a practical solution that extends over a broad 
range of known classes of quantum hacking attacks aimed at 
the detection equipment. The scheme is based on fundamental 
randomization of input modes to the detection apparatus inside 
Bob’s station, thus not deterministically accessible to the 
eavesdropper. Here we show that the use of beamsplitters and 
extra detectors at Bob’s station renders its apparatus immune 
to bright-light based attacks, as the blinding- and faked-states 
attacks [20,21]. The eavesdropper can no longer manipulate 
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the detectors without leaving a strong signature which is 
monitored by the counting statistics of the detectors. 
Correlation between detectors in equivalent spatial modes 
reveals the attack, without intervening on the inner workings 
of the devices. 
Additionally, we experimentally show that, as suggested in 
[12], a detector-scrambling strategy employed by Bob 
dynamically alters the detector used for measurement under 
the chosen basis, counteracting the attacks based on the 
detection efficiency mismatching, like the time-shift attack 
[12-13]. This proposal is readily implementable through the 
random application of a random rotation to invert the set of 
mutually unbiased detection bases. This is equivalent to an 
active spatial mode randomization since, after the basis 
choice, a random SPD will effectively be used for the 
detection of a particular state. 
The assumptions for the proposed counter-measure are that 
the eavesdropper has no access on the inner working of the 
devices and cannot deterministically manipulate the splitting 
ratio of the BS. The main drawbacks of our proposed scheme 
against quantum hacking are the increase in the number of 
detectors when compared to the traditional setup for the BB84 
protocol and an increase in the dark count rate. Nevertheless, 
the scheme provides a practical readily available real-world 
solution against, at least, those known classes of quantum 
hacking attacks. 
II. QUANTUM HACKING AIMED ON THE SPD 
A. The BB84 Context 
In the BB84 protocol [1], Alice prepares each qubit in a 
single-photon state, according to a random choice between 
four states that form two pairs of orthogonal states in 
canonically conjugated bases in a bi-dimensional Hilbert 
space. Considering polarization states encoding, the bases may 
be sorted from rectilinear (⊕), composed by horizontal and 
vertical states of polarization (SOPs); or diagonal (⊗), 
composed by diagonal (+45°) and anti-diagonal (-45°) states-
of-polarization (SOPs). 
Bob randomly chooses the measurement basis for each 
incoming qubit and has a deterministic or probabilistic result 
according to the overlap between his own and Alice’s chosen 
bases. Bob can choose to measure on ⊕ or ⊗ bases by turning 
the half-wave plate (HWP) to 0 or 22.5°, respectively.  
Bob’s typical detection apparatus for polarization qubits 
includes a HWP to change the measurement basis, a polarizing 
beamsplitter (PBS) and two SPDs, as seen in Fig. 1a. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  (a) Typical detection apparatus on Bob’s station for BB84-based QKD 
protocol. (b) Proposed countermeasure scheme with passive randomized 
spatial modes – employing two BSs and four SPDs – and active detector 
scrambling – increasing the set of angles at the HWP. 
 
If Alice’s and Bob’s bases match, the photon is routed to a 
deterministic spatial mode and is delivered to the SPD 
corresponding to the transmitted qubit. Otherwise, it becomes 
a superposition of the PBSs eigenstates and the photon 
randomly emerges at one output spatial mode, which can then 
be detected with an SPD. During the basis reconciliation in the 
post-processing round, Alice and Bob communicate though an 
authenticated channel and select only the time-slots when their 
bases have agreed. It is worth noting that only the time slots 
corresponding to a measurement result are considered, as in 
practice neither all pulses sent by Alice contain photons – due 
to imperfect photon sources – nor all received pulses can be 
detected by Bob – due to imperfect detectors and channel and 
component loss. 
B. The Avalanche Photodiode 
The traditional single-photon detector used in QKD systems 
is composed of a cooled InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) 
operated in gated Geiger mode and an avalanche quenching 
circuit [1,36-38]. When reversely polarized above the 
breakdown threshold – during short time windows – the 
device becomes single-photon sensitive, so impinging weak 
light may trigger a self-sustained avalanche. With the end of 
the gate, the overvoltage bias is reduced and the macroscopic 
burst current is quenched to reset the single-photon sensitivity. 
A discriminator circuit creates a formatted voltage pulse that 
indicates the occurrence of a photon count. APD-based single-
photon detectors are usually not photon number resolving, i.e., 
they cannot discriminate between a single-photon or multi-
photon optical pulse and emit an identical formatted voltage 
pulse in both cases. Apart the traditional commercial devices, 
different gating and quenching schemes can also be used with 
APDs to construct enhanced devices [39,40] and even photon-
number resolution capable detectors [41]. 
C. Bright light-based attacks: blinding plus faked states 
The Geiger mode makes the SPD sensitive to a single 
photon during the gate time due to the high electronic gain 
provided by the operational point above the breakdown 
voltage. However, when biased with lower voltage, the APD 
works in linear mode, as is usual in telecom applications. In 
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this case, the photocurrent generated in response to optical 
power is approximately linear. Therefore, if the bias voltage is 
brought below the breakdown, the device no longer detects 
single-photons. This behavior can be explored by Eve to 
disable Bob’s detectors. Of course, this strategy alone gives no 
information to Eve, but can be combined with other ruses, as 
discussed ahead. 
During this blinding attack, the eavesdropper sends strong 
light to enforce a current flow, which can alter the threshold 
breakdown value [15,24-27]. The excess voltage applied to the 
APD to enable Geiger mode is no longer sufficient and the 
detector becomes blind to single-photon detection. 
Even when operating with low bias voltage (in the case of 
free-running operation or outside a detection window in gated 
mode), the SPD may trigger an avalanche if a sufficiently 
strong pulse is received [20-21]. Assuming an interception-
resend strategy, Eve measures each qubit sent by Alice in a 
random basis and prepares a faked state to send to Bob 
according to the result obtained. If Bob’s basis choice matches 
Eve’s, the strong pulse is routed to the corresponding detector, 
forcing an avalanche with unity probability, and Eve knows 
that their results are correlated. However, if their bases 
disagree, the pulse is split and half the power is delivered to 
each of Bob’s detectors. As this half-power pulse is not 
sufficient to trigger an avalanche, no detection event takes 
place. The ruse renders all valid results obtained by Bob 
correlated to Eve’s, who then acquires high knowledge of the 
key. This strategy may be used standalone (e.g. aftergate 
attack [17]) or combined to the blinding scheme, causing no 
critical quantum bit error rate (QBER) increase [20-21], as 
Bob’s SPDs never click in the absence of a faked state. Not 
so-bright light-based attacks have also been reported, 
exploring the higher probability of a multi-photon pulse to 
cause an avalanche [18] or by selectively causing a deadtime 
on a detector [19]. 
D. Detection Efficiency Mismatch 
Each SPD operating in gated mode has its own time- (or 
wavelength-) dependent efficiency curve. This means that the 
device is usually more efficient in one temporal position 
(wavelength) relative to the other in a system, due to 
asymmetries or to temporal mismatch (different responsivity). 
Eve can explore a mismatch between the two efficiency curves 
to launch an attack by manipulating, for example, the time of 
arrival of the qubits relative to the gate windows. A faked 
states strategy may be employed [10,17,18,20,21], which 
makes the detection events of Bob more probable to occur at a 
certain detector according to the delay imposed by Eve. 
Another example is the time-shift attack [12,13], in which 
there is no interception at all by Eve, but only a bi-stable 
random (but known by Eve) delay change in the qubit time-of-
flight. By manipulating the optical path, Eve can position the 
optical pulse in a region of the gate window that increases the 
probability of a detection occurring in one or other SPD, 
allowing the eavesdropper to infer (part of) the key without 
even increasing the QBER. The drawback of this strategy is 
the reduction of the net detection efficiency of Bob’s 
apparatus that must be compensated by Eve. It is assumed, 
however, that Eve can replace the link by a more transparent 
one, or can teleport the states from Alice’s output to Bob’s 
entrance.  
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
Here we propose a countermeasure scheme aiming on 
closing the back-door opened by the SPD regarding its 
susceptibility to external manipulation by bright light. The 
spatial modes randomization is presented below. We also 
report on the experimental implementation of the detector-
scrambling strategy, previously suggested in [12], showing 
that the information of Eve can be hashed out toward zero 
when random rotation is applied to Bob’s detection bases, 
avoiding the efficiency mismatch-based attacks. 
A. Spatial Modes Randomization 
A practical scheme using beamsplitters and additional 
single-photon detectors is proposed to avoid the direct control 
of the detectors by the eavesdropper. Figure 1b shows a sketch 
of Bob’s apparatus employed in a BB84-based QKD system 
with the countermeasure implemented (in contrast, Fig. 1a 
depicts the traditional BB84 setup). For each received qubit, 
Bob chooses the measurement basis at his HWP and sends it 
to a PBS. Each output spatial mode of the PBS is randomly 
divided in two modes by each beamsplitter (BS) according to 
 
|1,0,	 
 √|1,0,	  √1  |0,1,	 (1) 
 
where the indices in and out represent the two input and two 
output modes of the BS. When the splitting ratio τ is 0.5, the 
photon has the same probability of emerging at one or other 
output mode. Each output spatial mode is delivered to a SPD. 
When under regular operation, whenever Bob’s basis is 
correctly chosen, detector A or B may click for a certain state 
(say, horizontal SOP); or detector C or D may click if the 
corresponding orthogonal state is received (vertical SOP). Due 
to the low average number of photons per optical pulse sent by 
Alice (µ), and the channel attenuation, the probability of both 
A and B, or C and D, detectors clicking together (coincident 
counts) is low. This is given by Poisson distribution as 
(disregarding the attenuation of the transmission channel and 
the losses inside Bob’s apparatus, for simplicity)    
1   !	, where η is the detection efficiency of the 
SPDs (assumed to be equal). If τ is 0.5, both detectors must 
exhibit similar photon counting statistics and low probability 
correlated events. When there is no basis agreement, however, 
any one of the four SPDs clicks at random, as shown in Table 
1. 
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TABLE I 
SPATIAL MODES OCCUPIED BY A SINGLE-PHOTON PULSE IN THE REGULAR 
SETUP OF THE BB84 PROTOCOL AND WITH THE PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE 
WITH τ=0.5. 
Alice Bob’s HWP Regular (Fig. 1a) 
Spatial modes 
countermeasure  
(Fig. 1b) 
Bit 
|H〉 
0° |A〉 (|A〉+|B〉) / √2 0 45° |C〉 (|C〉+|D〉) / √2 
22.5/67.5° (|A〉+|C〉)/√2 (|A〉+|B〉+|C 〉+|D〉) / 2 - 
|V〉 
0 |C〉 (|C 〉+|D 〉) / √2 1 45 |A〉 (|A〉+|B〉) / √2 
22.5/67.5° (|A〉+|C〉)/√2 (|A〉+|B 〉+|C〉+|D〉) / 2 - 
|D〉 
0 /45º (|A〉+|C〉)/√2 (|A〉+|B 〉+|C〉+|D〉) / 2 - 
22.5° |C〉 (|C 〉+|D 〉) / √2 0 67.5° |A〉 (|A〉+|B 〉) / √2 
A〉 
0 /45º (|A〉+|C〉)/√2 (|A〉+|B 〉+|C〉+|D〉) / 2 - 
22.5° |A〉 (|A〉+|B 〉) / √2 1 67.5° |C〉 (|C 〉+|D〉) / √2 
 
The proposed counter-measure aims on avoiding the control 
of the SPDs by the eavesdropper, what is accomplished 
through the randomization of the spatial modes by the two 
beamplitters. It is thus essential for the scheme to work that 
the splitting ratio of the BS cannot be manipulated by the 
eavesdropper.  It is known, however, that the splitting ratio of 
these devices is intrinsically wavelength dependent [42], and 
also the isolator’s insertion loss [43]. This means that a narrow 
filter must be inserted at Bob’s input to protect the BSs, as a 
Bragg grating in reflective mode with a circulator, for 
example. The free spectral range of a Bragg grating is 
sufficiently long to provide protection over the main spectral 
range in which the InGaAs-based SPD has significant 
detection efficiency (the Bragg resonance at the doubled 
frequency lies in the 775 nm region, considering the operation 
around 1550 nm). Furthermore, narrow filtering is a key 
element for the case of coexistence between classical and 
quantum communication over the same optical fiber links 
[44]. 
Consider that Eve launches bright optical pulses (in the 
bright-light attack context) to deterministically enforce an 
avalanche on Bob’s right detector(s) whenever their bases 
agree; or cause no avalanche if their bases are mismatched. 
This behavior is obtained due to power splitting at the PBS 
according to the SOP after basis choice, and a threshold power 
level can be defined related to this binary behavior. For 
simplicity (without lack of generality), suppose that Eve 
launches a H-polarized pulse with power P0. If Bob chooses 
rectilinear basis – which occurs with fifty-percent probability 
– full power emerges from the PBS to arm AB and the power 
splits to detectors A and B (see Fig. 1b) according to the BS 
split ratio as /#   and /#  1  . 
If the bases mismatch, half the input power emerges from 
each output mode of the PBS and, after splitting on the BSs, 
reach each detector as /#  $/#   and /# 
/#  1  . 
When under attack, neither the blinding mechanism nor the 
faked states can operate selectively. If τ=0.5, Eve can manage 
to set an attack point that is valid on both detectors, she is able 
to enforce coincident avalanches on both detector ever – this is 
the symmetric case. This is the best scene from Bob’s point of 
view, as him can easily verify an abnormal amount of 
coincidences between A and B, or C and D, highly above the 
Poisson expectation value, what will smoke the eavesdropper 
out, indicating the presence of the strong pulse.  
A more pessimistic case can be analyzed, when, in the 
matched bases case, Eve can enforce an avalanche on one 
detector (A) and none on the other on the same arm (B) – the 
asymmetric case. This can occur depending on the (fixed) 
asymmetry of the BSs (τ≠0.5). For example, Eve can send 
pulses capable of triggering an avalanche on detector A for 
sure and no avalanche at all on detector B; or can send a 
stronger pulse which fires both devices simultaneously (taking 
care not to exceed the threshold power when the bases 
disagree). Nevertheless, the counting distribution of detectors 
A and B on both symmetric and asymmetric cases diverges 
from the expectation of Bob and Eve’s ruse still can be 
detected. 
In this context, the use of four standard SPDs behind the two 
BSs passively creates random spatial modes that are not 
deterministically accessible to the eavesdropper. The blind 
strategy suffers from the same limitations, i.e. the blinded 
detector will always be the same, or both detectors will be 
always blinded, when the attack is performed. This works as a 
watchdog against the attacks and has advantages over a 
monitoring tap placed at the entrance of Bob’s station working 
as an auxiliary watchdog, since it causes no reduction on the 
system efficiency – the tapped portion of light is not effective 
for QKD. Furthermore, as discussed in [15,20], there is no 
guarantee that a tap-based watch-dog with classical or 
quantum detector cannot be manipulated by Eve, or if there is 
clear set point to warn Bob about the hacking. The drawbacks 
of our countermeasure are the increase in the resources 
employed and a rise in the dark count rate by a factor of 2. 
Asymmetry of the BS is not the critical point, but a possible 
asymmetry inversion caused by Eve, as discussed before. If 
Eve can deterministically manipulate the value of τ the 
security of the QKD section can be fully jeopardized. For 
example, suppose that Eve is able to set τ(λ1)=0.7 and 
τ(λ2)=0.3 and that the threshold power level is equivalent to a 
power loss of 0.5 relative to Bob’s input. So Eve can mimics 
the equiprobable occurrence of events at detectors A and B by 
sending pulses at λ1 (unitary probability for click at SPDA) or 
at λ2 (unitary probability for click at SPDB) by the same 
amount. 
Provided Eve cannot manipulate the splitting ratio of the 
BSs, let us focus on the case of an asymmetric BS. How well 
could Eve mimic the expected count ratios between the 
detectors, or redefining the question, how well can Eve mask 
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the lack of counts enforced on the SPD located at the less 
transmissive output port of the BS?  
A first approximation considers that Eve intercepts Alice’s 
pulses and attack Bob’s detectors with bright light for a 
fraction γ of the pulses, while employs a “regular” intercept-
resend strategy for the remaining fraction 1-γ of the pulses. 
Consider that the bright-light attack causes a binary response 
of the detectors. Again we concentrate in the case when Alice 
sends H-polarized states. Mapping the probabilities in a 
causality tree, as in [42], we get the results for each possibility 
of the independent basis choice from Eve and Bob. For the 
sifted events – the selected cases when Alice’s and Bob’s 
bases agree – it is found that the bright-light attack causes no 
error, but introduces (full) asymmetry between detection on 
SPDA and SPDB; while the intercept-resend attack introduces 
error (up to 25%), but causes no asymmetry between de count 
rates of that detectors. The bright-light attack also reduces the 
overall detection rate by a factor 2, due to the fact that if the 
bases of Eve and Bob disagree (half the cases), no event 
occurs. In this context, the sifting error introduced by Eve is 
given by %  1/41  ' /1  '/2 , which is lower bounded 
at zero, if only bright-light attack is performed (γ=1); and 
upper bounded at 0.25, if only intercept-resend attack is 
employed (γ=0). 
The ratio between the detection rates at SPDA and SPDB is 
given by  
 
)  1  ' /1  '/3  (2) 
 
This means that full bright-light attack results in total 
assymetry between counts on both detectors, while full 
intercept-resend attack causes no assymetry at all. 
A second approach considers that Eve intercepts Alice’s 
pulses and attack Bob’s detectors with bright light only for a 
fraction γ of the pulses, while the remaining fraction 1-γ is 
only bypassed to Bob. This strategy belongs to the most 
general class of attacks [45]. The main advantage of this 
strategy is that Eve causes no sifting error, independent of the 
value of γ. On the other hand, the ratio between the detection 
rates follows eq. (2), exactly as in the previous case, so the 
ruse is preferable by Eve’s point of view.  
Equation (2) gives the big picture for the degree of 
protection provided by our proposed counter-measured against 
bright-light-based attacks when fixed asymmetry of the BSs is 
considered. The fraction of events stolen by Eve is directly 
related to the asymmetry caused by the attack and the 
protection is directly given by the ability of Bob to check the 
asymmetry out. For example, if Bob is able to estimate the 
detection rate ratio with 1% of uncertainty, he can assume that 
Eve may have stolen 0.7% of information.  
B. Detector Scrambling 
The creation of the proposed random spatial modes does not 
directly avoid the detection-efficiency mismatch-based attacks 
(but increases the complexity level required for Eve’s ruse). 
The randomization of the detectors used for photon counting 
at Bob’s station is, nonetheless, sufficient to close this back-
door, while no additional hardware is needed.  
For each incoming qubit, Bob not only randomly chooses 
the detection basis, but also may randomly invert the 
attribution of the pairs of detectors. This means that, if Bob 
wants to use the rectilinear basis, the HWP may be turned to 
0º or 45º (or to 22.5º or 67.5º, if the diagonal basis is chosen). 
The additional choice [46] has no impact on the final value of 
the bit shared between Alice and Bob. For example, whenever 
Alice sends a H-polarized qubit, the bit inferred by Bob with 
matched basis is deterministic, say “0”, but the click can occur 
at either detector A’ (A or B in Fig. 1), if the HWP is set to 0º; 
or at detector C’ (C or D in Fig. 1), if the HWP is set to 45º. 
The same idea holds for the diagonal basis. The process is 
written as the randomization of Alice’s SOP to the spatial 
modes A and C as: 
 
|+,$- 
 cos 21  |1,0,  sin 21 |0,1,
|5,$- 
 sin 21 |1,0,  cos 21 |0,1,  (3) 
 
where θ is the physical angle of Bob’s HWP. 
Provided that this choice is truly random, Eve cannot infer 
at which SPD Bob’s detection has occurred, so the final spatial 
mode is not accessible to her. In the time-shift attack context, 
if Eve waits the basis reconciliation and learns that Alice and 
Bob agreed, there is no way to infer which version of the basis 
Bob has chosen and the detector used, based on the imposed 
delay, even if the efficiency curves are fully mismatched. The 
countermeasure is equivalent to an active randomization of the 
spatial modes and drastically reduces the mutual information 
between Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve. When Bob’s basis matches 
Alice’s, the logical result is deterministic, but the detector that 
registered the event is random. 
There is some discussion [13] if a Trojan-horse attack [47] 
could be attempted against the scrambler (the HWP in our 
case). Eve could send a strong pulse and read out the 
polarization rotation by analyzing the measured backscattered 
light. As discussed before, narrow filtering and isolators are 
necessary at the input of Bob’s apparatus to provide 
technological protection. Here the spatial modes 
randomization acts in the same way as described in Section 
III.A to avoid the Trojan-horse attack in a fundamental level.  
As the probe pulse used in the attack must be bright – to 
overcome the isolation from Bob’s HWP back to Eve – the 
photon counting statistics of Bob’s SPDs will behave 
differently as from the expected. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A. Spatial Modes Randomization 
The countermeasure against quantum hacking based on 
randomized spatial modes was experimentally implemented, 
as depicted in Fig. 2, which emulates the aftergate attack [17]. 
  
Fig. 2.  Experimental setup for the passive randomization of the spatial modes 
as a countermeasure for attacks using faked states. The 
aftergate attack. LD: laser diode; VOA: variable optical attenuator; MC: 
master clock; PF: pulse formatter; PC: polarization controller; PBS: polarizing 
beamsplitter. BS: beamsplitter; A-E: single-photon APDs.
 
During the attack, Eve intercepts the optical pulses sent by 
Alice and resend faked states to Bob according to her result
The statistics of the intercepted photons is ob
experiment by the detection of a continuous-
laser diode source (LD) sent by Alice though a variable optical 
attenuator (VOA). Eve detects the photons with a single
photon APD (labeled E) operating in gated-Geiger mode. The 
detector has 15% detection efficiency and opens 2.5
gates triggered by the system’s master clock (MC) at 100 kHz. 
A 10 µs deadtime is enforced after each detection event to 
avoid the afterpulse effect. Whenever a detection event occurs 
at Eve’s SPD, the voltage pulse created by the detector is 
compressed by a pulse formatter (PF) and drives Eve’s laser 
diode source (LDE). The bright-light faked states are sent by 
Eve to Bob’s station. The optical power 
regulated by a VOA and are delayed to reach Bob’s detectors 
at the attack point, at the end of the gate (
attack), as explained ahead. 
Bob’s station setup is similar to the concept depicted in 
1b, and is fully composed by fiber-optical elements. 
polarization controller (PC) acts as a HWP 
selection. Actually, this SOP selection is shared by Eve and 
Bob in this setup, and their combined angles are, in fact, 
emulated. A PBS performs the state projection and two BS 
create the passive randomized spatial modes, 
single-photon APDs are placed (labeled A to D)
are similar to Eve’s, including their configuration. A
based coincidence counting module is connected to the four 
SPDs to acquire the single and coincident 
The delay generator is used to trigger the four SPDs in 
that the strong pulse reaches them at the end of the gate, when 
under the aftergate attack; or inside the gate, when under 
regular (no-attack) operation. We note that in a real attack, 
Eve herself would manipulate the relative delay
faked states and the SPDs. 
To find the attack set point, a 1-ns wide optical pulse 
scanned though the detection gate of each one of the four 
SPDs used by Bob in the experiment. As the pulse peak power 
is increased, the gate end is extended, due to the residual 
overvoltage bias. The set point for the aftergate attack, shown 
 
setup emulates the 
 
. 
tained in the 
wave (CW) faint 
-
-ns wide 
of the pulses is 
hence aftergate 
Fig. 
A 
for the basis 
where the four 
. The SPDs 
n FPGA-
detection events. 
a way 
 between the 
was 
 
in Fig. 3, is reached when a 3-dB step 
sufficient to allow a binary beh
probability. 
Fig. 3.  Scan of optical pulses with 3-dB different peak power though the gate 
of the four SPDs used in the experiment (each subfigure corresponds to one of 
Bob’s SPDs). The set point for the aftergate attack, when a bi
the device is obtained, is indicated. All detectors are of the same model, 
except for SPDA. The higher separation of the curves for that detector is 
probably due to a different internal gate waveform.
 
The time delay between the bright 
gates is then fixed as indicated in Fig. 3. The 3
equivalent to the cases when Bob’s and Eve’s bases match 
(higher power reaching the right SPDs) or not (half
each detector). 
In the experiment, Eve sends horizon
Bob, who sets the rectilinear or diagonal 
with a HWP adjusted to 0° 
corresponding to matched and mismatched bases
Eve. The single and coincident events are collected during 300 
s for both cases with regular operation and under attack.
B. Detector Scrambling 
The detector-scrambling countermeasure was also 
experimentally implemented, as depicted in Fig. 4, which 
emulates the time-shift attack [12]. 
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in peak power is 
avior of the counting 
 
nary response of 
 
pulses and the detection 
-dB step is 
-power to 
tal or vertical SOPs to 
measurement bases 
or 22.5°, respectively 
 relative to 
 
 Fig. 4.  Experimental setup for the detector-scrambling 
against detection efficiency mismatch-based attacks. This setup emulates the 
time-shift attack. LD: laser diode; PF: pulse formatter; MC: master clock; 
VOA: variable optical attenuator; PC: polarization controller; HWP: half
wave plate; PBS:polarizing beamsplitter; A,C: single-photon APDs.
 
Alice sends 1-ns wide faint optical pulses th
optical attenuator (VOA) with horizontally
oriented SOPs to Bob. Alice’s laser diode source 
driven by the formatted pulses from the master clock
Bob launches the incoming pulses in free-
collimating fiber-pigtailed lens. The beam passes through a 
bulk HWP and a bulk PBS. The output modes of the PBS are 
collected with aspheric lenses and delivered to SPDs, set 
the previous experiment. Two SPDs were used for this proof
of-principle of the detector-scrambling strategy
be set to 0° or 45° − the two versions of the ⊕
elements make the adjustments easier in the experiment, but in 
practice a fiber-optical modulator must be employed. In QKD 
systems using active basis choice, which correspond to most 
commercial systems, the randomizing element can be the same 
one that Bob uses for his basis choice. The only difference is 
that a set of four different rotations become necessary, instead 
of two, which requires the use of two random number
clock. 
In the time-shift attack, Eve controls the time
pulses between Alice and Bob. Here, we analogously emulate 
the time shift by acting on the relative electronic delay 
between the optical pulses and the detection gates, all 
driven/triggered by the master clock. The relative gate delay 
of Bob’s detectors was scanned relative to 
and their normalized detection efficiency was
both devices.  
V. RESULTS 
The single and coincident counts were acquired for the 
system described in Fig. 2 with regular operation and under 
the aftergate attack. Both results are show in Fig. 
respectively, acquired with the HWP set to different angles.
 
 
countermeasure 
-
 
rough a variable 
- or vertically-
(LD) is 
 (MC). 
space through a 
as in 
-
. The HWP can 
 basis. The bulk 
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-of-flight of the 
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 measured for 
5a and 5b, 
 
Fig. 5.  Count rate of the four SPDs (a) with regular operation and 
the aftergate attack. The HWP is shared by Alice and Bob in the experiment, 
so the set angles represent the composition of their devices.
 
With regular operation, when the HWP is 
sends horizontally-oriented SOP and Bob measures in the 
matching rectilinear basis, so SPDA
for dark counts and residual optical misalignment effects). 
When the HWP is set to 45°, the pulses sent with vertical SOP 
are measured in the matching rectilinear basis.
HWP is shared by Eve and Bob in the experiment, so the set 
angle corresponds to the composition of their individual 
devices. The pulses are then routed to the other output mode 
of the PBS, and SPDC or SPDD click. When the wrong basis is 
chosen for measurement, with HWP set to 22.5
preferential branch to click and any detector may fire
Note the comparative behavior of the single 
matched bases: when under regular operation
is randomly routed to one of the two detectors of the 
corresponding branch after the PBS
under attack, a 3-dB level appears in the 
detectors, as both of them simultaneously 
optical pulse. This ratio must be hidden by Eve, 
accomplished by sacrificing half the detecti
interception step.  
The key point of the countermeasure appears when 
analyzing the coincident counts when
is assumed. Under normal operation, a small fraction of 
coincident counts is expected, between SPD
between SPDC and SPDD, due to multi
split in the BSs and dark counts. As seen in Fig. 
occurrence is very low. On the other hand, when 
aftergate attack, almost all detections 
coincident, i.e., Eve always enforces detection
and SPDB or in both SPDC and SPD
fingerprints are clear from the results
The coincident events between the other pairs of SPD
null. Here the symmetrical hypothesis
assumed, but the (fixed-) asymmetrical 
7
 
(b) under 
 
set to 0°, Eve 
 or SPDB click (excepting 
 Note that the 
°, there is not a 
. 
counts with 
, each faint pulse 
; on the other hand, when 
count rate of the two 
fire due to the bright 
which can be 
ons at the 
 the symmetric-BS case 
A and SPDB or 
-photon pulses that are 
5a, this 
under the 
(with matched bases) are 
s in both SPDA 
D, simultaneously. Eve’s 
 of the coincident counts. 
s are 
 of Section III.A is 
hypothesis will also 
 8
leave a strong signature, as only one detector of each pair will 
usually click – the fixed-asymmetric-BS case. 
Another fingerprint left by Eve is observed when the bases 
are not matched. Although these events are discarded by Alice 
and Bob in the sifting procedure, this is avaluable source of 
information to Bob regarding an external intervening, as the 
occurrence of uncorrelated photon counts is severely reduced 
when the attack is performed, as seen in Fig. 5. 
The results for the time-shift attack and the detector-
scrambling countermeasure, measured with the setup of Fig. 4, 
are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Normalized counting probability at Bob’s detectors SPDA and SPDC 
when Alice sends H- (black lines) or V-polarized (red lines) states and Bob 
uses ⊕ basis for measurement. (a) Traditional operation (Bob’s HWP set to 
0o); (b) flipped detectors (Bob’s HWP set to 45o); (c) averaged value with 
scrambled detectors (Bob’s HWP is randomly flipped between 0o and 45o for 
each generated pulse). The mutual information between Eve and Bob depends 
on the ratio between the counts at the detectors and appears as the blue lines in 
(a)-(c). The error bars come from the standard deviation of the counts. 
 
Figure 6 shows the case of temporal efficiency mismatching 
between the gates of SPDA and SPDC. The normalized 
counting probability at SPDA and SPDC are shown when Alice 
respectively sends H- (black curves) or V-polarized (red 
curves) weak coherent states and Bob uses the ⊕ basis for 
measurement. For each gate delay, the mutual information 
between Eve and Bob is calculated from the ratio of the curves 
of both detectors as [12] 
 
67  1  +	 8 9:9; (4) 
 
where r is the minimum ratio of the efficiency curves at a 
given delay and +	  is the Shannon entropy. The mutual 
information between Eve and Bob is also displayed the figure 
(blue lines). 
The results in Fig. 6a are obtained with the scan of the 
optical pulse through the detection gates when Bob’s HWP is 
set to 0° (⊕ basis), resulting in higher count rates in SPDA and 
SPDC, respectively, for H- and V-polarized states sent by 
Alice. This is the conventional operation without the detector-
scrambling countermeasure. Eve’s information can reach unity 
depending on the attack point (referring to the pulse delay 
enforced by Eve, i.e., the position of the optical pulse in the 
gate delay axis). If Eve enforces a set point to exploit the 
detection efficiency mismatch, her information about the 
resulting detection increases due to the higher probability of 
the event having occurred in the more efficient SPD. 
Fig. 6b exhibits equivalent results: Bob sets the HWP to 45° 
(⊕ basis with flipped SPDs), causing the detectors assignment 
to be inverted, therefore SPDA and SPDC now detect vertical 
and horizontal SOPs, respectively. The mutual information of 
Bob and Eve stills reaches high levels when looking only at 
this case. 
When the countermeasure is active in a QKD session, Fig. 
6a and 6b randomly occur, resulting in the averaged detection 
probability shown in Fig. 6c. We see that the efficiency 
mismatching disappears, and both curves corresponding to the 
detection of H- and V-polarized states are fairly identical. The 
causes of such an asymmetry are mainly the finite optical 
misalignment error of the SOPs and of the HWP (around 
0.5%) and the statistical dispersion of the data. The first cause 
can be improved by careful polarization alignment of the 
system, while the second cause can be reduced by improving 
the statistics of the collection of counting events. 
The mutual information between Eve and Bob drops 
significantly towards zero (the ideal value). A residual amount 
of information (due to the asymmetry discussed before) can be 
seen in Fig. 6c, but we can also see an efficiency penalty that 
must be compensated by Eve to cover her fingerprints: since 
the detectors are scrambled, Bob’s apparent efficiency is 
actually the average of the mismatched counting probabilities. 
If Eve chooses to delay the photons to a relative temporal 
position with allows for higher information leakage, but far 
from the efficiency peak (as in the delay -10 ns on Fig. 6c), the 
efficiency perceived by Bob will be considerably lower than 
the original expected peak values. The information an 
eavesdropper can extract, calculated from the normalized 
values, is reduced from the initial value of 97%, shown in Fig. 
6a, to values below 2% with the countermeasure active, shown 
in Fig. 6c.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that a full practical solution for all kinds of 
quantum hacking attacks aimed at all aspects of traditional 
QKD systems has not yet been found or proved to be possible, 
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the recent overflow of eavesdropping schemes motivated the 
proposal of many practical solutions. We have shown how 
some back-doors at the detection end can be closed in a 
standard BB84 frame with the creation of randomized spatial 
modes, passively by a combination of beamsplitters and extra 
SPDs and by actively scrambling the detectors at the 
measurement station. This represents a practical and readily 
implementable solution against bright-light- and efficiency-
mismatching-based quantum hacking attacks aimed on the 
single-photon detector so far. 
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